Confusion begins with terminology. B2C is a broad concept of selling to the end consumer, it includes marketplaces, retail, and D2C. D2C (direct-to-consumer) is a specific way of organizing B2C, in which the brand itself owns the sales channel, customer data, and the entire contact chain — from the first click to post-purchase service. On a marketplace, the brand sells B2C, but not D2C: the customer belongs to the platform, not the brand.
The difference manifests in three things:
It makes sense to transition to D2C not when 'everyone else is doing it,' but when the brand already has recognition and repeat customers who are ready to seek the product directly, and when there are resources for 3–6 months of unprofitable marketing — that is exactly how long it takes on average for the channel to become profitable.
A nice story about a margin 25–40% higher only works with precise unit economics. Without it, D2C becomes a way to beautifully go bankrupt.
| Indicator | Benchmark | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| CAC | 3 000–8 000 rubles in the first year | cost of acquiring one customer through your own channel |
| Website conversion rate | 0,5–1,5% for new stores, 5–7% for leaders | share of visitors who placed an order |
| LTV/CAC | minimum 3:1 | customer lifetime value versus customer acquisition cost |
| Margin | in 2–3 times higher than wholesale | effect of eliminating intermediaries |
If the LTV to CAC ratio is below 3:1, this is a signal not to 'push the creatives harder', but to review the model: perhaps the product is not suitable for repeat purchases, or the average order value is too small to justify the cost of acquisition. Conversion below 1% at the start is normal, not a failure, but it must grow along with brand awareness, otherwise the economics will not work out in principle.
The opposition between 'either own or marketplace' is outdated. Marketplaces will continue to grow as a share of e-commerce, but the independent D2C sector also demonstrates potential for regaining market share, and completely abandoning them means losing volume and access to new audiences. A realistic strategy is a hybrid where each channel has its own role.
Brands that fully depend on one D2C channel risk hitting a ceiling in CAC growth and audience saturation on ad platforms. Omnichannel here works not as a pretty word, but as a safeguard against this risk.
Most failures are repeated from project to project, and almost all of them are managerial, not technical.
Warby Parker and Glossier did not grow from a single website with a shopping cart — they built a service and community around their product: home try-on for eyewear, vision testing in an app, and developing a cleansing product formula based on audience feedback. This is a fundamentally different level of customer engagement than simply 'moving a catalog to your own domain.'
The model fits well with categories that have high emotional engagement, a need for product explanation, or regular repurchase: cosmetics, sleep and health products, food products with short delivery cycles, niche clothing and accessories with strong brand identity. A Russian example is an express food delivery service within two hours using in-house couriers: a category with high purchase frequency is ideally suited for a direct channel.
D2C does not work well where the purchase decision depends on price and comparing offers at the moment of purchase — mid-tier household appliances, standardized products without a strong brand, products with low repurchase frequency and no surrounding story. In such categories, marketplaces almost always win in terms of customer acquisition cost.
This is exactly where the main difference between a strong D2C strategy and a simple 'website launch' lies. Transitioning to direct-to-consumer sales requires reevaluating not only marketing, but also the product, service, and organizational structure. A company that takes D2C seriously transforms the development cycle: the product is created with consideration for feedback from actual buyers, rather than being pushed down from the procurement department. It was this approach that gave birth to the Milky Jelly Cleanser formula at Glossier — based on hundreds of comments from the audience under a blog post.
Positioning is also changing: the brand stops being 'just one of the products on the display' and becomes a source of content, education, and community. Rubetek builds its D2C around educational content, while Levinka does so around a subscription model and handwritten cards in each shipment. These are decisions made by the entire company — a matter of culture, where customer data becomes a shared resource for the product, marketing, and service, rather than a report that only one manager reviews.
If you look at D2C only as a way to escape marketplace fees, the channel will remain a loss-making experiment. But if you build it as a source of data, loyalty, and product insights, it becomes sustainable growth that does not depend on the rules of someone else's platform.